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Abstract
I investigate the relationship between big-time college football programs and state appro-
priations to public institutions of higher education. Estimation of a linear reduced form model
of the determination of state appropriations to higher education, using a panel of ﬁnancial,
athletic, and state-speciﬁc economic data from 570 public institutions of higher education at
the Baccalaureate level or higher from 1976-1996 shows that schools with Division I-A football
programs receive about 6% more in state appropriations than schools that do not ﬁeld a Divi-
sion I-A football team. Institutions with successful football teams receive 3% to 8% increases
in state appropriations the following year. Defeating an in-state rival in a prominent football
game is also associated with an increased level of appropriation in the following year. These re-
sults support the predictions of the model of competition for political inﬂuence among pressure
groups developed by Becker (1983) and suggest that the total economic beneﬁt associated with
big-time athletic programs may be larger than previously thought.
JEL Keywords: H720 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures; I280 - Education: Govern-
ment Policy; L830 - Sports.
Introduction and Motivation
What beneﬁts do intercollegiate athletics provide to colleges and universities? The size of the eco-
nomic impact of intercollegiate athletics is a hotly debated topic among economists and decision
makers at universities, as well as in the popular press. The issue turns on whether or not inter-
collegiate athletics drain or contribute to university budgets. This debate is important because
intercollegiate athletics are large visible parts of universities, commanding considerable economic
resources. In many instances, claims of large indirect beneﬁts are the primary justiﬁcation for large
expenditures on high proﬁle intercollegiate athletic programs.
Intercollegiate athletics produces both direct and indirect economic beneﬁts. The direct beneﬁts
include ticket, concession and parking revenues associated with hosting games, television and radio
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1revenues, payments for postseason appearances, and the sale of licensed merchandise bearing the
institution’s name and logo. Prior research on the indirect economic beneﬁts of intercollegiate
athletics has focused primarily on the eﬀect of success in intercollegiate athletics on charitable
giving and on enrollment and the quality of students. Here, I examine the eﬀect of intercollegiate
athletics on the size of state government’s appropriation to institutions of higher education.
Becker (1983) developed a model of competition among political pressure groups for political
inﬂuence. In this model, the inﬂuence gained by pressure groups depends, in part, on the eﬃciency
of each group at producing political pressure. In the context of Becker’s model, universities, alumni,
and athletic boosters can be interpreted as pressure groups vying for inﬂuence in state legislatures
with other pressure groups. A big-time intercollegiate athletic program, as well as success on the
playing ﬁeld, can be viewed as methods for generating political pressure in state legislatures. Thus
this paper can also be thought of as a limited test of Becker’s model of political inﬂuence, applied
to state appropriations to higher education.
Supporting the idea that intercollegiate athletics can have an important eﬀect on state funding,
Zimbalist (1999) recently discussed the possibility of intercollegiate athletics “arousing legislative
largess among sports-crazed representatives” (page 152). Also, Shapiro (1983) documented the
important role played by big-time athletics in the growth of Michigan State University.
No clear consensus has emerged in the academic literature on the relative magnitude of the
beneﬁts and costs associated with intercollegiate athletics. Zimbalist (1999) argued that because
some costs are hidden and only the most extreme positive revenues are reported in the popular
press, most athletic departments at large universities operate in the red. Goﬀ (2000) performed a
careful case study of the overall ﬁnancial impact of intercollegiate athletics at a relatively low-proﬁle
Division I school, Western Kentucky University. After accounting for various accounting peculiar-
ities, Goﬀ concluded that the athletic department at Western Kentucky ran modest surpluses in
most years and argues that if this is true at Western Kentucky, it may also be true at other similar
institutions, suggesting that many Division I athletic departments operate in the black on average.
The idiosyncratic nature of the accounting practices used at universities makes the assessment of
the total economic impact of intercollegiate athletics diﬃcult. Typical accounting inconsistencies
include assigning the revenues and expenses generated by athletic events to a variety of non-athletic
accounts within the institution, or in some cases to other outside entities like booster clubs. Despite
the disagreement in the net impact, both these studies agree that intercollegiate athletic programs
generate some indirect economic beneﬁts.
Prior research on the indirect economic beneﬁts generated by intercollegiate athletics focus on
the impact on donations and on the quantity and quality of students enrolled in the institution.
This research looks for evidence that athletic success leads to more giving by alumni and fans
and attracts more and better students to the institutions. Both Goﬀ (2000) and Zimbalist (1999)
provide extensive surveys of this literature, which has found little evidence of signiﬁcant positive
indirect beneﬁts.
The research on indirect beneﬁts of intercollegiate athletics has overlooked one important po-
tential source of indirect beneﬁts, appropriations from state governments. To date, no detailed
study of the relationship between intercollegiate athletics and government appropriations has been
carried out. This relationship may be important because most big-time college athletic programs
are public institutions and public institutions receive a large portion of their revenues in the form
of appropriations from state governments. Over the period 1974-2000 150 institutions sponsored
a Division I-A football team, the largest classiﬁcation of schools in the NCAA, for two or more
seasons.1 80% of these 150 big-time athletic programs are public universities. Over this 26 year
1NCAA records indicate that ﬁve Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Alcorn State, Grambling,
2period appropriations from state governments accounted for 32% of each institution’s current fund
revenues, a larger share than revenues from tuition and fees, 19%, or revenues from charitable
donations, 4.7%, the primary focus of previous research on indirect economic beneﬁts from inter-
collegiate athletics. Also, appropriations from state government are part of the state budgeting
process and may not be aﬀected by the irregular accounting practices that plague other athletic
accounts.
There are many reasons to believe that an institution’s annual appropriation from the state
government could be aﬀected by the presence of intercollegiate athletics. A number of these expla-
nations emerge from the predictions of Becker’s (1983) model of competition for political inﬂuence
among pressure groups. Many residents and state legislators are alumni of a state’s public institu-
tions of higher education and other residents of a state who are not alumni may follow the big-time
athletic teams in that state; these individuals can be interpreted as a pressure group competing
with other groups - perhaps including alumni and boosters of another rival university in a state - for
political inﬂuence in state legislatures. In this model, the political inﬂuence obtained by each pres-
sure group depends on how eﬃcient each group is in producing pressure. Prominent and successful
athletic programs can be interpreted as one way of eﬃciently generating political pressure.
For states without major professional sports teams, like Nebraska, Oklahoma, Alabama, Iowa,
Arkansas, Kentucky, and others, the big-time athletic programs at public universities may be the
only prominent local sports teams. Larger state subsidies for the major college teams in these states
may play a role similar to the subsidies given to professional sports teams for stadium construction
in large cities.
Intercollegiate athletics may also be interpreted as a signal of overall quality of the output of
a school by state legislators. The beneﬁts of an outstanding department in the humanities or a
Nobel Prize winning chemist might not be apparent to the state legislators deciding on the annual
appropriation to the state university, but ﬁelding a successful Division 1-A football team puts
the university in the news frequently and prominently. Also, football games are a likely place for
administrators to lobby key legislators, providing schools with big time athletic programs with a
competitive advantage in lobbying legislators.
These factors all suggest that state appropriations to individual institutions of higher education
may be aﬀected by the presence of big-time intercollegiate athletics. In this paper I investigate the
possibility that such an eﬀect exists, and is economically important.
Empirical Modelling Approach
I use a linear reduced form empirical model of the annual state appropriation to individual institu-
tions of higher education to assess the impact of intercollegiate athletics. Although I do not develop
a formal economic model of the determination of appropriations, simple linear reduced form models
like this one can be motivated by the optimality conditions from a wide variety of economic models
either in a general equilibrium setting or from a public choice perspective. See, for example Garvin
(1980), Creedy and Francois (1990), (1993) and the discussion in Hoenack and Pierro (1990). The
general form of this empirical model is
Ai,j,t = βXi,t + γZj,t + i,j,t (1)
where Ai,j,t is the state government’s appropriation to institution i in state j in year t, Xi,t is
a vector of institution-speciﬁc factors that might aﬀect state appropriation to the institution in a
Jackson State, Southern University, and Texas Southern, played Division I-A football for a single season, 1977. In
this case I treat these schools as members of the smaller Division I-AA throughout the sample period.
3given year, Zj,t is a vector of state speciﬁc economic controls that might aﬀect year is appropriation
to higher education, i,j,t is a mean zero, constant variance equation error term capturing other
factors that aﬀect annual state appropriation to public institutions of higher education, and β and
γ are vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated. Although a few large public institutions
of higher education receive direct appropriations from the federal and local governments, state
appropriations constitute the largest source of appropriated government funds.
Humphreys (2000) showed that aggregate state appropriations to higher education are sensitive
to business cycle conditions. Because tax revenues are procyclical and many state governments face
annual balanced budget constraints, state appropriations to higher education tend to rise and fall
with the business cycle. For this reason, it is important to control for the eﬀects of the business
cycle on state appropriations to individual institutions.
Other institution-speciﬁc factors also aﬀect the level of state appropriations to institutions of
higher education. Many states have adopted formal funding formulas that link the level of appro-
priation to enrollments or other factors like the size of the physical plant. In other states, informal
funding formulas are used. However, considerable latitude exists in the relationship between state
appropriation and enrollments even in states with formal funding formulas. For this reason I include
a vector of observable institution-speciﬁc variables in the empirical model rather than explicitly
modelling the funding formulas.
Other factors, like the mission of the institution and the market served by each institution,
may also aﬀect the level of state appropriation given to institutions. Institutions with signiﬁcant
research missions, or comprehensive land-grant universities charged with providing education in a
wide variety of disciplines may have diﬀerent funding than institutions located in the suburbs of
large cities with large numbers of non-resident part-time students including working adults. In any
event, the variables in Xi,t should reﬂect the factors speciﬁc to each institution that aﬀect the level
of state appropriation.
Xi,t also contains variables related to the intercollegiate athletic oﬀerings at each institution.
The parameters estimated on these variables will be used to assess the impact of intercollegiate
athletic oﬀerings on the level of state appropriations.
Data
The US Department of Education conducts an annual survey of enrollment and ﬁnancial conditions
at institutions of higher education.2 I created a panel of enrollment and ﬁnancial data for all public
U.S. institutions of higher education at the Baccalaureate level or higher over the period 1975-1996.
The Financial Statistics survey results are not available for years after the 1996-1997 academic year
at this time. Using only public institutions that were in the surveys for the entire 1976-1996 period
produced a balanced panel with 570 institutions. Omitting institutions with missing observations
over this period eliminates less than 5% of the observations for public colleges and universities at
the Baccalaureate level or higher in the HEGIS/IPEDS survey universe.
The National Center for Educational Statistics also publishes price indexes appropriate for use
with data for institutions of higher education. These include the Higher Education Price Index
(HEPI) and a version of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculated on an academic year (July-to-
July) basis. The HEPI was used to deﬂate the nominal state appropriation data for each institution.
2Since 1986, this survey has been called the Integrated Postsecondary Educational Survey (IPEDS). Prior to
1986, it was called the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS). Both are actually annual censuses
of all accredited postsecondary educational institutions. These data are available on-line at the National Center for
Educational Statistics (http://nces.ed.gov).
4Table 1: Variables in Model, Means, and Sources
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Source
Ai,j,t Annual Real State Appropriation $31,400,000 IPEDS Financial Characteristics Survey
UGEi,t Undergraduate Enrollment 1,050 IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey
GREi,t Graduate Enrollment 6,194 IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey
INCi,t State Personal Income Per Capita $12,995 BEA Regional Accounts Data
D1i,t =1 if Football Team is Division 1-A 0.16 NCAA Football, various years
Wi,t Football Wins 5 NCAA Football, various years
BGi,t Team appeared in Bowl Game 0.29 NCAA Football, various years
BRi,t =1 when team beat primary in-state rival 0.23 NCAA Football, various years
Detailed data on the performance of NCAA Division I-A football teams can be found in the
annual publication NCAA Football. I extracted the performance measures for NCAA Division 1-A
football teams from these annual publications. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US
Census Bureau publishes data on state personal income and state population.3 I obtained estimates
of state personal income and state population from the BEA. Personal income was deﬂated using
the Consumer Price Index. Table 1 shows the relevant variables, their means, and the source of
each variable.
Empirical Estimation and Results
The vector Xi,t contains variables that reﬂect the eﬀects of factors speciﬁc to each institution
on the level of state appropriation. Among the most important of such factors are those related
to the speciﬁc mission of each institution and the markets served by each institution. For this
analysis, I use two variables to capture these eﬀects. The number of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE)
undergraduates and FTE postgraduate students enrolled in the Fall semester of each academic year
at each institution. FTE enrollment counts three part-time students as one full-time student, thus
in a rough sense correcting for the propensity for some institutions to attract part-time students,
who are typically non-resident and working, and may also be outside the traditional 18-22 year old
age bracket of undergraduates. Including undergraduate and postgraduate enrollment separately
also reﬂects the scale and intensity of research activities at each institution, as those institutions
with extensive research missions will tend to enroll more postgraduate students than institutions
with more intensive educational missions. Enrollment also proxies for the size of the institution.
Xi,t also contains variables that reﬂect the intercollegiate athletic oﬀerings of each institution.
Initially, I use a simple dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the institution is a member of the
NCAAs Division 1-A, the largest classiﬁcation of NCAA athletic programs.
Zj,t is a vector of state speciﬁc economic controls. Economic conditions aﬀect state budgets,
primarily through their eﬀect on revenues. Changes in state government revenues may also aﬀect
state appropriations to higher education. I used real state per capita personal income as a proxy
for the economic conditions in each state. For the service academies in the sample, I use the federal
appropriation to each as the measure of government appropriation and real gross national income
as the control for business cycle eﬀects.
3Available on line at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi/.
5Pooling
The ﬁrst issue that must be addressed is the pooling of the data in this panel. In this setting, the
most important issue is how to model the intercepts, or group-speciﬁc eﬀects. Testing for pooling
is a straightforward process. The null hypothesis of homogenous intercepts for all groups in the
sample versus the alternative of heterogeneous intercepts can be tested with an F-test. Following
the procedure suggested by Hsao (1986), I considered three alternative formulations for Equation
(1). A pooled model
Ai,j,t = α∗ + βXi,t + γZj,t + i,j,t (2)
where all groups in the panel have a homogeneous intercept, a institution-mean corrected model
Ai,j,t = α∗
i + βXi,t + γZj,t + i,j,t (3)
where each institution has a separate intercept, and a state-mean corrected model
Ai,j,t = α∗
j + βXi,t + γZj,t + i,j,t (4)
where each state has a separate intercept. Because the level of state appropriation is determined
by each state legislature in each year, the state-mean corrected model is an important alternative
to the institution-mean model.
Note that these empirical models are nested, in that the state-mean corrected model and the
pooled model can be expressed in terms of the institution-mean corrected model with a series of
linear restrictions placed on the intercept parameters. In particular the pooled model imposes
the restriction that α∗




j for all h = k. These restrictions can be tested using an F-test. The results of these
tests provide guidance about the appropriate way to empirically model the intercepts.
The F-test of the institution-mean corrected model vs. the pooled model clearly favors institu-
tion speciﬁc eﬀects. The value of the F-statistic is 145, and the P-value is 0.00, clearly rejecting
pooling in favor of institution-speciﬁc eﬀects. The F-test of the state-mean corrected model vs.
the institution speciﬁc model has a value of 15.2 and a P-value of 0.00, implying that institution-
speciﬁc eﬀects are rejected in favor of state-speciﬁc eﬀects. The reason for this may be that the
undergraduate-graduate composition of the student body, along with the size eﬀects, captured by
the enrollment variables adequately proxy for the institution-speciﬁc eﬀects. Based on the the
results of these tests, I estimated all empirical models with state-speciﬁc intercept terms. The
parameter estimates for these terms are not included in the tables, but they are available from the
author by request.
I also included state-speciﬁc time trends and year dummy variables in the empirical models.
The state-speciﬁc time trends capture any systematic state-speciﬁc changes in higher education
over the sample period. The year dummy variables capture any factors that aﬀect all institutions
in the sample in a particular year. These factors include national business cycle eﬀects, federal
government policy changes, and factors common to the entire cohort of students entering higher
education in a particular year. I also included an overall time trend in the model to capture any
systematic changes in funding to higher education funding that aﬀect all institutions in the sample.
The level of state appropriation to higher education is typically set before the start of the
academic year in states, although the exact timing varies somewhat across states. This raises the
possibility that explanatory variables dated in period t will be correlated with the equation error
term. To avoid this endogeneity problem, I lag all of the explanatory variables to period t − 1 in
the model. Lagging these variables two years produced similar results to those reported here.
6Results
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the linear reduced form model of the determination of
state appropriation to institutions of higher education deﬁned by Equation (4) using OLS.4 Model
(1) uses a simple dummy variable as a proxy for the eﬀect of intercollegiate athletics on state
appropriation to higher education. All variables in Model (1) are statistically signiﬁcant using a
two-tailed test at the 5% level or better. The parameter on the dummy variable for participation
in Division I-A football is positive, suggesting that public institutions with big-time college football
programs receive a larger annual state appropriation than public institutions that play football
at lower levels or have no intercollegiate football program. One explanation for this increase in
appropriation is that a big-time football program allows a universities’ administration, alumni, and
athletic boosters to produce political pressure more eﬃciently, because of the visibility of the team
and the lobbying opportunities generated by home football games. The size of the estimated impact
of Division I-A football on state appropriation is modest, about 6% of the sample average annual
appropriation.
The other parameters are correctly signed and signiﬁcant. The real per capita income variable
suggests that state appropriations are pro-cyclical and that each $1 increase in real per capita
income increases state appropriation to an institution of higher education by $3,160; the annual
state appropriation rises and falls with the previous year’s level of real state income per capita.
Again, the explanation for this is that state tax revenues also rise and fall with state per capita
income and many state legislators face annual balanced budget requirements. States tend to balance
their budgets in periods of falling tax revenues by reducing appropriations to higher education.
The elasticity of this estimated parameter is 1.31 at the sample means, suggesting that the increase
(decrease) in state appropriation to institutions of higher education is more than proportionate to
the increase (decrease) in state real per capita income the previous year. This elasticity is close to
the elasticity reported by Humphreys (2000), 1.42, using data aggregated to the state level.
The enrollment variables are positive, suggesting that state appropriation rises with the size
of the student body. The parameters on the FTE graduate and undergraduate variables suggest
that institutions receive considerably more state funding for a FTE postgraduate student than
for a FTE undergraduate. I interpret this as evidence of greater state funding for institutions
of higher education with research missions and comprehensive land grant institutions with many
programmatic oﬀerings at the postgraduate level. Also note that the parameter on the overall time
trend is negative and signiﬁcant, reﬂecting a general downward trend in state ﬁnancing to higher
education over the sample period. The size of this parameter suggests that real state appropriations
have fallen by about 2.5% per year over the sample period.
Model (2) uses a diﬀerent metric for intercollegiate athletic oﬀerings, the total number of regular
season football wins in the previous season for Division I-A teams. This variable reﬂects not only
the presence of a Division I-A football team but also the on-ﬁeld success of the team. I included both
wins and wins squared to control for the possibility of a diminishing marginal impact of additional
wins on state appropriations. The results from Model (2) suggest that more successful athletic
programs are rewarded with additional state funds, although the marginal impact of additional
wins declines rapidly.5
Model (3) uses a richer set of football success variables. In essence, Model (3) posits that all
4I also applied the Newey-West estimator to correct for heteroscedasticity and AR(1) serial correlation. This
correction had no impact on the sign or signiﬁcance level of the estimated parameters, so I have reported the OLS
results. The asymptotic standard errors from the Newey-West correction are available by request.
5I also estimated the model using winning percentage instead of wins. The results are identical to those using
wins.
7Table 2: Results of OLS Estimation of Equation (1)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Real State Per Capita Income INCj,t−1 3161† 3167† 3163†
(536) (537) (536)
FTE Graduate Enrollment GREi,t−1 16151† 16072† 15958†
(164) (165) (167)
FTE Undergraduate Enrollment UGEi,t−1 1685† 1649† 1662†
(52) (52) (52)
D1 D1i,t−1 1929341† – –
(668535) – –
Football Wins Wi,t−1 – 1062865† 1194790†
– (309638) (317506)
Football Wins Squared W2
t−1 – -75076† -137801†
– (34743) (39205)
Bowl Game BGi,t−1 – – 4012800†
– – (1267306)
Won “Big Game” BRi,t−1 – – 2160939†
– – (1018705)
Overall Time Trend -824040† -820201† -813528†
(206561) (206499) (206375)
N 10,816 10,816 10,816
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84
Standard errors in parentheses. †: Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
8wins are not equal when it comes to their impact on state appropriations. Model (3) includes a
dummy variable for appearances in post-season bowl games in the previous season and a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if team i won “the big game” in the previous season. I deﬁne “the big
game” as an annual or very frequently scheduled game between two large and prominent public
universities in the same state.6 The NCAA calls these “Trophy Games” and many have symbols or
names associated with them: Michigan vs. Michigan State (the “Paul Bunyon Game”), Alabama
vs. Auburn (the “Iron Bowl”), Mississippi-Mississippi State (the “Golden Egg”), etc. Table 4 in
the appendix lists these games. Note that some personal judgement was used to identify these “big
games.” The general criteria used were that the institutions had to be public and in the same state
and had to play regularly through the sample period.7
The empirical results suggest that winning the “big game” is associated with an increase in
appropriation of about $2.1 million in real 1982 dollars in the following year, an increase of just
under 7%. This can be viewed as empirical support for the predictions of Becker’s (1983) model
of competition for political inﬂuence among pressure groups. In states with two prominent public
institutions of higher education, these two institutions and their alumni and boosters, will be
continually competing for political inﬂuence in the state legislature and other bodies governing
higher education. Head-to-head competition in a high proﬁle football game might provide one
pressure group with an edge in the following year, allowing the winner to produce pressure more
eﬃciently.
The parameter estimate on the “big game” variable shows some sensitivity to the teams included
in the list of rivals. As an alternative, I used an expanded group of games that also meet the
criteria, including about 15 additional games involving Fresno State vs. San Jose St., Mississippi
vs. Southern Mississippi, etc., but the parameter estimate on this variable was not statistically
signiﬁcant. Perhaps these games do not suﬃciently capture the attention of the relevant agents, or
perhaps they are not rivalries in the sense of the games listed in the appendix.
The results from Model (3) suggest that all college football games are not equal in terms of their
impact on annual state appropriation to higher education. Making an appearance in a postseason
bowl game has an impact on the following year’s appropriation, as does winning the “big game.”
Table 3 summarizes the total impact of on-ﬁeld success at the Division 1-A level on annual state
appropriation to the institutions of higher education in the sample. The ﬁrst column shows the
ﬁnancial impact of wins on state appropriations, in percentage terms. From this column alone,
it appears that the most successful seasons are punished by lower appropriations in the following
year. However, column two adds in the impact of appearing in a postseason bowl game. The ﬁrst
ﬁve rows in column three are empty because, under NCAA rules, teams must have a winning record
to qualify for a bowl appearance. Column three adds the eﬀect of winning the “big game” to the
impact of wins, and column four adds both the bowl and “big game” impacts.8
Notice that the overall impact of wins and a bowl appearance is relatively ﬂat for all but the best
and worst seasons. Football teams with between 3 and 10 wins in a season, and with a postseason
bowl appearance for the most successful, result in an increase in appropriation of between 2.5%
and 7% the following year - a relatively modest increase. Winning the “big game” increases the
6Games between such rivals accounted for slightly less than 4% of the 27,286 college football games played by
Division I-A teams between 1976 and 1996.
7Two rivalries are asymmetric. North Carolina State is the rival for East Carolina - they played 14 times in the
sample period - but North Carolina is State’s rival; Navy is the rival for Air Force but Army is Navy’s rival. The
results are unchanged if Navy is replaces Army as Air Force’s rival.
8I also estimated a model that included a dummy variable for years when an institution’s football team was on
probation, but that variable was not signiﬁcant. Apparently the relevant agents are not concerned with cheating by
football teams.
9Table 3: Average Annual Impact
Percent Change in Real Annual State Appropriation
# Wins Wins Only + Bowl + Big Win + Both
1 1.2% – 3.6% –
2 2.1% – 4.5% –
3 2.6% – 5.1% –
4 2.9% – 5.3% –
5 2.9% – 5.3% –
6 2.5% 7.0% 4.9% 9.5%
7 1.8% 6.4% 4.3% 8.8%
8 0.8% 5.4% 3.3% 7.8%
9 -0.5% 4.1% 2.0% 6.5%
10 -2.1% 2.5% 0.4% 4.9%
beneﬁt to between 3.6% and 5.3%. Very bad teams - those that win only 1 or 2 games - get a
smaller increase in appropriation in the following year.
Conclusions
Public colleges and universities with big-time intercollegiate athletic programs receive a larger
annual appropriation from state governments than those that do not have such programs and
successful programs generate larger increases in appropriations than unsuccessful ones. Defeating
an in-state rival public institution on the ﬁeld also leads to increases in appropriations. However,
the indirect ﬁnancial beneﬁts ﬂowing from big-time football programs appear to be modest. A
successful football season might increase state appropriations by 5% to 8% in the following year,
and a team with a respectable losing record might garner a 2% to 4% increase, other things equal.
These increases in appropriation support the predictions of Becker’s (1983) model of competition
among political interest groups.
In terms of the ongoing debate on the proﬁtability of intercollegiate athletic programs, this
research shows that the overall economic beneﬁts generated by big-time athletic programs are
larger than previously thought. A larger number of athletic programs at public universities probably
generate positive economic returns for the institution in any given year. Furthermore, the indirect
economic beneﬁts described here go into the general revenue fund at institutions, not directly to
the athletic program. In this sense, they may help to further the broader educational and research
missions of public colleges and universities.
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Table 4: In-State Public Rivals
Air Force*-Navy Arizona St.-Arizona
Army-Navy Auburn-Alabama
California-UCLA Cincinnati-Miami OH
Clemson-South Carolina Colorado St.-Colorado
East Carolina*-North Carolina St. Florida-Florida St.
Georgia-Georgia Tech Indiana-Purdue
Iowa -Iowa St. Kansas St. - Kansas
Memphis St.-Tennessee Michigan St.-Michigan
Mississippi St. -Mississippi New Mexico - New Mexico St.
North Carolina St.-North Carolina Oklahoma - Oklahoma St.
Oregon - Oregon St. Penn St. - Pittsburgh
Texas - Texas A&M Utah-Utah St.
Virginia - Virginia Tech Washington-Washington St.
Louisville-Kentucky
*: Rivalry not symmetric, only for ﬁrst team.
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